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HARM TO COMPETITION AND THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS: 
A CIRCULAR CHARADE IN THE LIBOR ANTITRUST 
LITIGATION 
 
 
Sharon E. Foster* 
 
 
Law, says the judge as he looks down his nose, 
Speaking clearly and most severely, 
Law is as I’ve told you before, 
Law is as you know I suppose, 
Law is but let me explain it once more, 
Law is The Law.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Must the injury to a plaintiff be caused by the defendant’s competitive 
process for there to be harm to competition and, thus, an antitrust injury?  
According to the holding of the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York in In re LIBOR-Based Financial 
Instruments Antitrust Litigation2  (In re LIBOR), the answer is “yes.”  
Plaintiffs in In re LIBOR were consumers of interest rate sensitive 
financial products. They alleged that the defendants, participating panel 
bank members for the U.S. Dollar LIBOR, agreed to manipulate the U.S. 
Dollar LIBOR, 3  a benchmark for interest rates. This manipulation 
allegedly caused damage to the plaintiffs in violation of section 1 of the 
Sherman Act (anti-cartel antitrust law).  The court dismissed the antitrust 
claims, asserting a novel theory: In order to have the requisite “antitrust 
injury” (a requirement for a civil antitrust action) 4  the defendants’ 
conduct causing the plaintiffs’ injuries must be a competitive process.5  
This paper asserts that the court’s holding is erroneous because the 
defendants’ conduct of manipulating LIBOR harmed competition and 
caused the plaintiffs’ injuries, which is sufficient to allege an antitrust 
injury. 
Section II of this paper provides background on the defendants’ 
alleged LIBOR manipulation in In re LIBOR. LIBOR is an interest rate 
benchmark used by about 75% of interest rate sensitive financial 
products around the world.6 Control of the benchmark equates to control 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
* Associate Professor, University of Arkansas School of Law.  The author would like to thank 
the University of Arkansas School of Law for its generous grant. 
1 W. H. AUDEN, COLLECTED POEMS 208 (Edward Mendelson ed.) (1976). 
2 935 F. Supp. 2d 666, 687  (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
3 LIBOR stands for “London Interbank Offered Rate.” Sharon E. Foster, LIBOR Manipulation And 
Antitrust Allegations, 11 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 291, 292 (2013). 
4 Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 648 (1969); J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors 
Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 562 (1981). 
5 In re LIBOR, 935 F.Supp.2d at 687. 
6 Lauren Oppenheimer et al., UNDERSTANDING LIBOR, THIRD WAY (2012), http:// 
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the price of interest. According to the plaintiffs’ allegations, substantially 
confirmed by recent settlement agreements between some of the 
defendants and various competition authorities around the world,7 the 
defendants provided fraudulent data to manipulate the interest rates, 
thereby causing plaintiffs’ injuries.  The plaintiffs sued for antitrust 
violations and other causes of action in the In re LIBOR matter. 
Section III of this paper explores the court’s confusing process of 
trying to define an “antitrust injury,” which is perhaps indefinable.8 To 
have standing to sue in a civil antitrust matter, plaintiffs must allege an 
“antitrust injury.” 9  Attempts to categorize harm that constitutes an 
“antitrust injury” have been about as helpful as Justice Stewart’s 
explanation regarding what constitutes obscenity: “I know it when I see 
it.”10  
Although courts have not been clear in defining “antitrust injury,” the 
term has generally been held to mean that the plaintiffs’ injuries stem 
from the defendants’ conduct, which also harms competition. 11  This 
inevitably leads to an examination of what conduct courts believe harms 
competition. While the law is not a model of clarity here, there seems to 
be a consensus that wealth transfers based on fraud, misrepresentation, or 
anticompetitive markets harm competition. 
Section IV of this paper examines the “competitive process” in the 
antitrust context on which the District Court’s opinion is premised. 
Interestingly, all relevant authority treats “competitive process” as 
synonymous with harm to competition. The court, however, cites no 
authority in its finding that there can be no harm to competition if the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
content.thirdway.org/publications/570/Third_Way_Memo_-_Understanding_Libor.pdf; British 
Bankers’ Association, available at http://www.bbalibor.com/bbalibor-explained/the-basics; Financial 
Services Authority, FINAL NOTICE (27 June 2012) at ¶¶ 3 and 13; Jacob Gyntelberg and Philip 
Wooldridge, Interbank Rate Fixings During The Recent Turmoil, BIS QUARTERLY REVIEW (March 
2008) p. 59; Foster, Supra note 3, at 297-99. 
7 Financial Services Authority, FINAL NOTICE (Barclays) (27 June 2012); Statement of Facts, 
nonprosecution agreement, dated June 26, 2012, between the United States Department of Justice, 
Criminal Division, Fraud Section, and Barclays Bank PLC; Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission Order, In the Matter of Barclays, CFTC Docket No. 12-25; Financial Services 
Authority, FINAL NOTICE (Royal Bank of Scotland) (6 February 2013); Plea agreement: United 
States of America v. RBS Securities Japan (5 February 2013); Order Instituting Proceedings, In the 
matter of: Royal Bank of Scotland PLC (Commodity Futures Trading Commission)(6 February 
2013); Order Instituting Proceedings, In the matter of: UBS AG, United States, Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission, (19 December 2012); Statement of Facts, Non-prosecution agreement: UBS 
AG, United States, Department of Justice, (18 December 2012); Final Notice, Imposing financial 
penalty: UBS AG, United Kingdom, Financial Services Authority, (19 December 2012). 
8 Antitrust injury as a requirement for standing in a private antitrust: Coors Brewing Co. v. 
Miller Brewing Co., 889 F.Supp. 1394, 1400 (D. Colo. 1995) citing to Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield of Kansas, Inc., 899 F.2d 951, 960–61 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1005, (1990) 
(applying Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort, Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986) and Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl–
O–Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977)). See City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 955 F.2d 641, 
652 n. 14 (10th Cir.1992); Sharp v. United Airlines, Inc., 967 F.2d 404, 406 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. 
denied, 506 U.S. 974 (1992); Anesthesia Advantage, Inc. v. Metz Group, 759 F.Supp. 638 
(D.Colo.1991). See also Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart J., concurring). 
9 Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 197 (Stewart J., concurring). 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
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defendants’ conduct is not a “competitive process.” Indeed, there is a 
whole body of law relating to noncompetitive conduct harming 
competition in the standard setting cases. Accordingly, Section V of this 
paper explores the standard setting cases disregarded by the In re LIBOR 
court as distinguishable. The court’s distinction, however, is in error 
because the standard setting cases all involved processes that are 
arguably not competitive. Specifically, these cases involved information 
sharing, just as in the In re LIBOR case, yet the courts found harm to 
competition.  
II. THE LIBOR MANIPULATION CONDUCT 
LIBOR is a benchmark to which, at the time in question, 75% of 
interest rate sensitive financial products around the world were pegged.12 
Approximately $750 trillion in financial products exist globally. 13  
Approximately $560 trillion of that $750 trillion directly reference 
LIBOR rates,14 which is about a 75% market share.  Controlling LIBOR 
equates to controlling interest rates. 
LIBOR was conceptualized as an interest rate benchmark based on 
the estimated interest rate one bank would pay to borrow unsecured 
funding from another bank.15  The British Bankers Association, which 
administered LIBOR from its inception and through the relevant time 
period,16 collects data in response to this question: “At what rate could 
you borrow funds, were you to do so by asking for and then accepting 
inter-bank offers in a reasonable market size just prior to 11:00 a.m.?”17  
The given rates are calculated on a daily basis for fifteen different 
time periods, from overnight loans up to twelve month loans. 18  
Depending on the currency involved, a panel of six to eighteen banks 
submits data.19  For example, the U.S. Dollar LIBOR panel consists of 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
12 Oppenheimer, supra note 6; BBALIBOR, supra note 6; FINANCIAL SERVICES, supra note 6, at 
¶¶ 3 and 13; Gyntelberg & Wooldridge, supra note 6,at 59; Foster, supra note 3, at 297-99. 
13  THE NEW YORK TIMES (August 23, 2012), LIBOR (Barclays Interest Rate Manipulation 
Case). This amount has been calculated as high as $800 trillion (see, e.g., Congressional Record 
(August 2, 2012) (S5959)) and as low as about $360 trillion (see, e.g., Barclays Paying $453 Million 
to Settle LIBOR Probe; CEO Quits, 18 No. 17 Westlaw Journal Derivatives 2 (July 6, 2012)).  Part 
of the discrepancy is a result of what is included in the figure, the broad “financial products” or 
specific instruments such as loans. Foster, supra note 3, at 297-99. 
14 Oppenheimer et al., supra note 6; Foster, supra note 3, at 297-99. 
15 BBALIBOR, supra note 6; Bank of England, Trends in Lending (July, 2012) available at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/other/monetary/trendsJuly12.pdf; 
FINANCIAL SERVICES, supra note 6; Alvin L. Arnold, Financing: Understanding Libor, 44 No. 6 
MORTGAGE & REAL ESTATE EXECUTIVES REPORT 6 (May 15, 2011); Foster, supra note 3, at 297-
99. 
16 THE WHEATLEY REVIEW OF LIBOR: FINAL REPORT 5 (2012); Foster, supra note 3, at 297-99. 
17 LIBOR: Frequently Asked Questions, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (July 16, 2012), 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42608.pdf. 
18 Id.; FINANCIAL SERVICES, supra note 6, at ¶ 34; Foster, supra note 3, at 297-99. 
19 BBALIBOR, supra note 6; FINANCIAL SERVICES, supra note 6, at ¶ 34; Foster, supra note 3, at 
297-99. 
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eighteen banks submitting the requested data. 20   The interest rate 
benchmark is then calculated by “the average of the second and third 
quartile submissions, since the highest and lowest are rejected.” 21 
Participating banks were selected according to their reputation, credit 
quality, and activity in the major international financial market of 
London.22    
LIBOR is an indicator of the financial stability of the major banks in 
the world:23 a higher interest rate paid by a bank suggests the bank is at 
risk, while a lower interest rate suggests a bank is less risky.24  Beginning 
around September 2007, the start of the financial crisis, LIBOR data was 
manipulated by submitting artificially low rates to make it appear that the 
participating banks were stable.25 
According to the plaintiffs in the In re LIBOR litigation, the 
agreements to suppress LIBOR during this period by the defendants 
amounted to price fixing, which resulted in damages to plaintiffs.26 Some 
plaintiffs purchased interest rate swaps from the defendants, which 
provided that the plaintiffs would receive payments based on LIBOR. 
When the defendants allegedly suppressed LIBOR, the plaintiffs 
received lower payments from the defendants.27 Some plaintiffs allegedly 
received artificially depressed amounts of interest on debt securities 
(bonds) with interest rates tied to LIBOR.28 Some plaintiffs allegedly 
paid higher prices for Eurodollar futures contracts as a result of 
suppressed LIBOR rates. 29  Finally, some plaintiffs allege that the 
artificially depressed LIBOR rates reduced the value of “tens of billions 
of dollars in LIBOR-based financial instruments the [plaintiffs] held or 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
20 BBALIBOR, supra note 6; U.K. FINANCIAL SERVICES, supra note 6, at ¶ 34; Foster, supra 
note 3, at 297-99. 
21 Peter Vinella, The Trials of Libor Litigation, 19 No. 14 Westlaw Journal Derivatives 2 (2013). 
22 Participating banks were selected twice yearly by the Foreign Exchange and Money Markets 
Committee, a committee comprised of anonymous market participants, meeting in undisclosed 
locations to discuss LIBOR panel participation in strictly confidential terms. BBALIBOR, supra note 
6; Liam Vaughan, Secret Libor Committee Clings to Anonymity Following Scandal, BLOOMBERG 
(August 21, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-20/secret-libor-committee-clings-to-
anonymity-after-rigging-scandal.html. Banks recently on LIBOR panels included: Abbey National 
PLC; Bank of America; Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd; Bank of Nova Scotia; Barclays Bank 
PLC; BNP Paribas; Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce; Citibank NA; Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia; Credit Agricole CIB; Credit Suisse; Deutsche Bank AG; HSBC; JP Morgan Chase; 
Lloyds Banking Group; Mizuho Corporate Bank; Rabobank; Royal Bank of Canada; Société 
Générale; Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation; The Norinchukin Bank; The Royal Bank of 
Scotland Group; and UBS AG.  Many of these banks have participated in more than one panel. 
BBALIBOR, supra note 6; Commodity Futures Trading Commission Order, In the Matter of 
Barclays, C.F.T.C. Docket No. 12-25, at 6; Foster, supra note 3, at 297-99. 
23 See BBALIBOR, supra note 6. 
24 Arnold, supra note 15; Foster, supra note 3, at 297-99. 
25  FINANCIAL SERVICES, supra note 6, at ¶¶ 102-45; Non-prosecution Agreement between 
United States Department of Justice and Barclays Bank PLC (June 26, 2012) at 15-22; Commodity 
Futures Trading, supra note 22, at 19-25; Foster, supra note 3, at 297-99. 
26 In re LIBOR, 935 F.Supp.2d at 677. 
27 Id. at 682. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
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purchased.”30 According to the court in the In re LIBOR case, these 
alleged damages failed to establish an antitrust injury because 
manipulating LIBOR is not a competitive process.31 While defining an 
“antitrust injury” is an elusive exercise, manipulating LIBOR did cause 
antitrust injury in this case.32 The court’s requirement of a “competitive 
process,” as explained in more detail below, is not a recognized antitrust 
injury requirement, nor should it be. 
III. WHAT CONSTITUTES AN ANTITRUST INJURY? 
The requirement of an antitrust injury in a civil antitrust action is 
premised upon the statutory interpretation of the Clayton Act, which 
states, “any person who shall be injured in his business or property by 
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue.”33 With these 
words Congress sought to create a private right of action to deter antitrust 
violations. 34 Congress recognized the political nature of antitrust 
enforcement by the government as well as the potential for a lack of 
enforcement due to political reasons.35   
The Clayton Act is broad and leaves much of its practical effect to 
judicial interpretation. As with other areas of antitrust law, the court must 
balance between a broad application of the law, and its danger of “false 
positives,” against a narrow application, and its dangers of “false 
negatives.”36 This balancing act has led to undesirable swings between 
over protection and under protection due, in part, to the political nature 
of the antitrust problem. Courts have yet to articulate an intelligible 
theory of “antitrust injury,”37 but have generally held that it is the type of 
injury Congress was concerned with in providing for a private right of 
action. 38  This Congressional concern has been defined as “harm to 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
30 Id. (emphasis added). 
31 Id. at 677. 
32 Id. 
33 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1914). 
34 Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov’t of India, 434 U.S. 308, 313-314 (1978). See also Brunswick Corp. v. 
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485-86 n.10 (1977); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts 
Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968); Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 
556, 572-73 n.10 (1982); Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982). 
35 Cong. Rec. 9245-47 (1914). 
36 Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489; Yavar Bathaee, Developing an Antitrust Injury Requirement for 
Injunctive Relief that Reflects the Probablity of Anticompetitive Harm, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. 
L. 329, 333-35 (2008). 
37 Bathaee, supra note 35 at 335-36. 
38 Blue Shield of Va., 457 U.S. at 478. See Lago & Sons Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood, Inc., 892 
F.Supp. 325, 339 (D.N.H., 1995) (citing to Sullivan v. Tagliabue, 25 F. 3d 43, 46 (1st Cir. 1994); 
Associated Gen. Contractors of California v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S.Ct. 897, 
908-12 (1983). See also Los Angeles Raiders v. NFL, 484 U.S. 826 (1987); R.C. Dick Geothermal 
Corp. v. Thermogenics, Inc., 890 F. 2d 139, 146 (C.A.9 (Cal.), 1989.); Xerox Corp. v. Media 
Sciences Intern, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 2d 372, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum 
Comm’n v. NFL, 791 F. 2d 1356, 1363 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nom.; Balaklaw v. Lovell, 
14 F. 3d 793, 798 (2d Cir. 1994). 
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competition.”39 
A. Antitrust Injury 
The court interpreted the statutory language “any person who shall be 
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the 
antitrust laws,”40 as requiring more than a typical causation damages 
analysis. A plaintiff in a civil antitrust action must establish antitrust 
injury by showing that the defendant’s conduct caused injury to the 
plaintiff.41 The plaintiff must also establish whether he is an “efficient 
enforcer.” This means that his antitrust injuries must not be too indirect, 
remote, or speculative, and that there are no other plaintiffs better suited 
to vindicate the harm. Additionally, the plaintiff must show that there is 
no risk of duplicative recoveries, and that he can efficiently and 
effectively enforce the judgment.42 The In re LIBOR court did not reach 
the efficient enforcer requirement, therefore it is discussed in this 
paper.43 
Antitrust laws are intended to prevent harm to competition.44 These 
laws are not meant to protect a competitor from competition. 45  For 
example, when the plaintiff is a competitor of the defendant, the 
plaintiff’s damages may be a result of enhanced competition rather than 
negative effects on competition. The defendant’s conduct may violate 
antitrust laws and harm the plaintiff. However, if the plaintiff’s harm is 
not a result of actual or probable harm to competition, there is no 
injury. 46  Therefore, a defendant’s conduct must harm plaintiff’s 
competition for an antitrust injury to exist.  
The first step in determining if there is an antitrust injury is to identify 
the “harm to competition associated with the [conduct].”47 It is this first 
step that the court in In re LIBOR found lacking on the basis that there 
could be no harm to competition, because the act of setting the LIBOR 
benchmark was not, in itself, a “competitive process.” 48  As will be 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
39 Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 (1990); Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 
489; Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Violations in Securities Markets, 28 J. CORP. L. 607, 622 (2003) 
(arguing that antitrust requires an injury to competition). 
40 15 U.S.C. §15 (2013). 
41 J. Truett Payne Co., 451 U.S. at 562. 
42 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977); Associated Gen. Contractors of California, 
103 S.Ct. at 908-12; Todorov v. D.C.H. Healthcare Authority, 921 F. 2d 1438, 1451-52 (11th Cir. 
1991); Sunbeam Television Corp. v. Nielsen Media Research, Inc., 711 F. 3d 1264, 1271-72 (11th 
Cir. 2013). 
43 In re LIBOR, 935 F.Supp.2d 666, 686 (S.D.N.Y 2013). 
44 Brooke Group. Ltd. V. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 251 (1993); see 
Nichols v. Mahoney, 608 F.Supp.2d 526, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
45 Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 477; Bathaee, supra note 36 at 337. 
46 Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 477. 
47 John E. Lopatka, William H. Page, Who Suffered an Antitrust Injury in the Microsoft Case? 
69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 829, 832 (2001). 
48 In re LIBOR, supra note 43 at 738. A court may or may not find harm to competition 
depending upon its underlying philosophical perspective that competition is harmed by inefficiency, 
elimination of small businesses, lack of protection of consumers, or a combination of these factors. 
Bathaee, supra note 36 at 335-36. 
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explained later, the court was incorrect in its conclusion because conduct 
that is not a “competitive process” may certainly harm competition. 
B. Harm to Competition49 
Only a likelihood that competition will be reduced or harmed is 
required for an antitrust injury to exist.50 Conduct that tends to promote 
competition, for example, increasing the number of competitors or 
reducing prices, does not harm competition and therefore does not cause 
an antitrust injury.51 
Conversely, conduct that decreases the number of competitors and/or 
increases prices52 may harm competition.53 In some cases, a decrease in 
the number of competitors is due to conduct that should be encouraged, 
such as innovation or improvements in quality and service.54 In such 
cases, no inefficiencies are associated with the conduct and there is no 
harm to competition.55 When considering what harms competition, courts 
have looked at how consumers are impacted in economic reality.56 There 
is an exception however, lower prices are usually not an antitrust 
violation when they benefit the consumer. For example, lower prices that 
are predatory when a company sets prices below costs to eliminate 
competition and later raises them once the competition is eliminated.57  
In a monopsony situation, where market power is on the buying side 
of the market rather than the production side, the monopsonist may be 
able to buy for less and thus sell for less, benefiting consumers. The 
monopsonist usually drives down supplier prices by restricting 
purchases, resulting in a reduction of outputs (production) and higher 
prices to consumers. As with predatory pricing, this is manifest in short 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
49  M. Laurence Popofsky, Adam J. Gromfin, Bundled Discounting: From Lepage’s to 
PeaceHealth, & Beyond, 9 SEDONA CONF. J. 99, 109 (2008); PeaceHealth, 2007 WL 2473229 at 
*17 n.21. In Peacehealth the “Ninth Circuit found [harm to competition] “redundant because it is no 
different than the general requirement of ‘antitrust injury’ that a plaintiff must prove in any private 
antirust action. Thus, the Court chose not to adopt the “superfluous” requirement.” 
50 Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 477, 489; Atl. Richfield Co., 495 U.S. at 344; Paycom Billing Servs. v. 
MasterCard Int'l, Inc., 467 F.3d 283, 290 (2d Cir. 2006); Alternative Electrodes, LLC v. Empi, Inc., 
597 F.Supp.2d 322, 328-29 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); Naso v. Park, 850 F.Supp. 264, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) 
(citing to Volmar Distributors, Inc. v. New York Post Co., Inc., 825 F.Supp. 1153, 1159-60 
(S.D.N.Y. 1993)); Xerox Corp., 511 F.Supp.2d at 380-81. 
51 Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 477, 489; Atl. Richfield Co., 495 U.S. at 344; U.S. v. Solinger, 457 
F.Supp.2d 743, 759 (W.D.KY. 2006) (citing to HyPoint Tech, Inc., 949 F.2d at 877). 
52 Lopatka, supra note 47 at 832-83 (“We believe that the most reliable measure of harm to 
competition is the effect of the practice on price and output.”). 
53  Solinger, 457 F.Supp.2d at 760 (W.D.KY. 2006) (citing to Valley Products Co. Inc., v. 
Landmark, a Div. of Hospitality Franchise Systems, Inc., et al., 128 F.3d 398, 403 (6th Cir. 1997). 
54 See Solinger, 457 F.Supp.2d at 760 (W.D.KY. 2006) (citing to Valley Products Co., Inc.,, 128 
F.3d at 403; Blue Shield of Va., 457 U.S. at 482-84 (1982) (citing to Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 
U.S. 330 (1979)). 
55 Lopatka, supra note 47 at 829, 832-33. 
56 U.S. v. Conn. Nat’l Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 662 (1974); U.S. v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 
575-76 (1966); see FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 456 (1986). 
57 Atl. Richfield Co., 495 U.S. at 337-38, 340; Kartell v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts, 749 F.2d 
922, 930–931 (1st Cir.1984); Addamax Corp. v. Open Software Foundation, Inc., 888 F.Supp. 274, 
279-80 (D.Mass. 1995). 
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term lower prices, which lead to long term higher prices, thereby 
harming competition and the consumer.58 Additionally, the suppression 
or exclusion of innovation may be “tantamount to a cartel's output 
restriction,” 59  resulting in inefficiencies and/or higher prices causing 
harm to competition. 60  
Harm to competition rarely comes in the form of a direct attack. If the 
defendant’s conduct indirectly, but foreseeably harms competition, it 
may provide the basis for an antitrust injury even though the harm was 
unintended. For example, an anticompetitive scheme may indirectly but 
inevitably harm or threaten to harm competition by reducing consumer 
choice by eliminating competitors, resulting in increased prices. 61 
Furthermore, providing data to competitors through trade associations to 
help set standards (discussed in Section V below), or to help competitors 
judge market conditions may suppress and thereby harm competition, 
albeit indirectly.62  
However, collaboration between competitors may have 
procompetitive effects.63 The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”) have published the Antitrust Guidelines for 
Collaborations Among Competitors (2000) (“Guidelines”) to help assess 
whether competitor collaboration harms competition and is thus an 
antitrust violation. According to the Guidelines: “[C]ompetitor 
collaboration comprises a set of one or more agreements, other than 
merger agreements, between or among competitors to engage in 
economic activity, and the economic activity resulting there from.”64 
This may include information sharing through trade associations.65 
In determining if the competitor collaboration harms competition, the 
DOJ and FTC look at whether the collaboration: 
 
[I]ncreas[es] the ability or incentive profitably to 
raise price above or reduce output, quality, service, or 
innovation below what likely would prevail in the 
absence of the relevant agreement. Such effects may 
arise through a variety of mechanisms. Among other 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
58 See J. Jacobson & G. Dorman, Joint Purchasing, Monopsony and Antitrust, The Antitrust 
Bulletin, 1, 17 (Spring, 1991); Areeda et al., ANTITRUST LAW, 361 n.10 (2nd ed. 2001); Addamax 
Corp. v. Open Software Foundation, Inc., 888 F.Supp. 274, 279-80 (D.Mass. 1995); Lawrence A. 
Sullivan, Warren S. Grimes, The Law Of Antitrust: An Integrated Handbook 76 (Second ed. 2006). 
59 Lopatka, supra note 47 at 829, 835. 
60 Lopatka, supra note 47 at 829, 835. 
61 Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. at 482-84; see Xerox Corp., 511 F.Supp.2d at 
381; Alternative Electrodes, LLC, 597 F.Supp.2d at 328-29; A. Michael Ferrill, Leslie Sara Hyman, 
Soledad Valenciano, Antitrust And Consumer Protection, 64 SMU L. Rev. 19, 37 (2011). 
62  American Column & Lumber v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 398-99 (1921); U.S. v. 
Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969); U.S. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 457 
(1978). 
63 U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among 
Competitors, (2000), http:// www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf [hereinafter Guidelines]. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 3.  If the information sharing is likely to disrupt price setting by free market forces there 
is harm to competition. See FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 461-62 (1986). 
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things, agreements may limit independent decision 
making or combine the control of or financial interests in 
production, key assets, or decisions regarding price, 
output, or other competitively sensitive variables, or may 
otherwise reduce the participants’ ability or incentive to 
compete independently. 
Competitor collaborations also may facilitate 
explicit or tacit collusion through facilitating practices 
such as the exchange or disclosure of  competitively 
sensitive information or through increased market 
concentration. Such collusion may involve the relevant 
market in which the collaboration operates or another 
market in which the participants in the collaboration are 
actual or potential competitors.66 
 
… 
 
[Additionally][t]he nature of the agreement is 
relevant to whether it may [harm competition].  For 
example, by limiting independent decision making or 
combining control over or financial interests in 
…decisions on price, output, or other competitively 
sensitive variables, an agreement may create or increase 
market power or facilitate its exercise by the 
collaboration, its participants, or both. An agreement to 
limit independent decision making or to combine control 
or financial interests may reduce the ability or incentive 
to compete independently. An agreement also may 
increase the likelihood of an exercise of market power 
by facilitating explicit or tacit collusion, either through 
facilitating practices such as an exchange of 
competitively sensitive information or through increased 
market concentration…. In some cases, …a 
determination of anticompetitive harm may be informed 
by consideration of  market power.67 
 
… 
 
Agreements that facilitate collusion sometimes 
involve the exchange or disclosure of information. The 
Agencies recognize that the sharing of  information 
among competitors may be [pro-competitive]….  
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
66 Guidelines, supra note 63, at 6. 
67 Id. at 12. 
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Nevertheless, in some cases, the sharing of information related to a 
market in which the collaboration operates or in which the participants 
are actual or potential competitors may increase the likelihood of 
collusion on matters such as price, output, or other competitively 
sensitive variables. The competitive concern depends on the nature of the 
information shared. Other things being equal, the sharing of information 
relating to price, output, costs, or strategic planning is more likely to 
raise competitive concern than the sharing of information relating to less 
competitively sensitive variables.68 
The economic reality of competitor collaboration, similar to the 
LIBOR information sharing for the benchmark, is that it has the potential 
to facilitate conduct harmful to competition. In In re LIBOR, the alleged 
LIBOR manipulation conduct involved sharing sensitive price 
information, including fraudulent price information, which encouraged 
collusion on interest rate prices. While this conduct may be indirect in 
the sense that the defendants did not agree to fix interest rates, the 
defendants’ agreement to fix the benchmark that controlled interest rates 
nevertheless disrupted price setting by free market forces and caused 
harm to competition.69 
Finally, some courts examine the alleged harm to competition to see 
if there is any harm to consumer welfare.  Generally, under a consumer 
welfare analysis, harm to competition, “does not invoke the Sherman Act 
until it harms consumer welfare.” 70  Consumer welfare is maximized 
when economic resources are allocated to their best use,71 and when 
consumers are assured competitive price and quality.72 Accordingly, an 
act is deemed anticompetitive under the Sherman Act only when it harms 
allocative efficiency and raises the prices of goods above competitive 
levels or diminishes their quality.73 
Accordingly, an antitrust plaintiff must establish harm to competition, 
which entails allocative inefficiency (economic resources not allocated to 
best use) 74  and harm to consumers (prices are or will be above 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
68 Id. at 15. 
69 FTC, 476 U.S. at 461-62. 
70 Rebel Oil Co., Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir. 1995). See Hon. 
Richard D. Cudahy & Alan Devlin, Anticompetitive Effect, 95 MINN. L. REV. 59 (2010) (on 
anticompetitive effects and consumer welfare); see Reiter, at 442 U.S. 343 (1979) (Congress 
designed the Sherman Act as a “consumer welfare prescription.”) (quoting ROBERT H. BORK, THE 
ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF  66 (1978)). 
71 See Nat’l Gerimedical Hosp. & Gerontology Ctr. v. Blue Cross of Kansas City, 452 U.S. 378, 
387-88 (1981). 
72 See Products Liab. Ins. Agency Inc. v. Crum & Foster Ins. Cos., 682 F.2d 660, 663-64 (7th 
Cir. 1982). 
73 Cf. Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 221 (1993) 
(below-cost pricing is not anticompetitive in itself because, although it causes allocative inefficiency, 
it brings lower aggregate prices in the market). Cudahy & Devlin, Anticompetitive Effect, 95 Minn. 
L. Rev. 59 (2010). 
74  See Rebel Oil Co., Inc., 51 F.3d at 1433; Gregory T. Gundlach, Joan M. Phillips, 
Contributions and Challenges of Marketing to Antitrust, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 51 (2003); Bork, 
supra note 70 at 127. 
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competitive levels or of diminished quality). 75   In the LIBOR 
manipulation, both factors were present because the fraudulent LIBOR 
data created allocative inefficiencies (harm to competition),76 and the 
plaintiffs’ financial products were of diminished quality (consumer 
harm).77 
C. Harm to Competition in International Antitrust 
Cases addressing the extraterritorial application of United States 
antitrust laws on foreign conduct illustrate what is “harm to 
competition.” In the international context, extraterritorial jurisdiction 
requires “domestic effects,” which is harm to domestic competition (the 
traditional harm to competition test for antitrust injury).78 As a result, the 
foreign conduct in question must have “direct, substantial, and 
reasonably foreseeable effect” on American domestic, import, or 
(certain) export commerce[or a domestic competitor.], 79  and have an 
effect of a kind that antitrust law considers harmful, i.e., the “effect” 
must “giv[e] rise to a [Sherman Act] claim.”80 
In the international context, of course, there are many additional 
issues like remoteness (a worldwide injury is probably not enough under 
the effects test)81, domestic nature82 and comity.83 For the purposes of 
this paper, however, only international cases are considered to see, under 
the effects test, what is considered harm to competition. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
75 See Reza Dibadj, Article 82: Gestalt, Myths, Questions, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 615, 629-31 (2007) for an interesting critique on attempts to define consumer welfare and 
allocative efficiency. 
76 Justine R. Watkins, Always Low Prices, Always At A Cost: A Call To Arms Against The Wal-
Martization of America, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 267 (2006); Clara Torres-Spelliscy, Safeguarding 
Markets From Prenicious Pay to Play: A Model Explaining Why SEC Regulates Money in Politics, 
12 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 361, 403 (2013) (citing to Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, 
Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 673 (1984)). 
77 In re Libor, 935 F.Supp.2d at 676. 
78  Christopher Sprigman, Fix Prices Globally, Get Sued Locally? U.S. Jurisdiction Over 
International Cartels, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 265, 277-78 (2005). 
79 15 U.S.C. § 6(a); F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 162 (2004). 
80 F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., 542 U.S. at 162; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 
764, 796 (1993) (citing Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582 
(1986); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 415 (1987); 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust 
Law ¶ 236 (1978); cf. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704 
(1962); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 288 (1952); United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 
274 U.S. 268, 275–276 (1927); Metallgesellschaft AG v. Sumitomo Corp. of America, 325 F.3d 836, 
842 (7th Cir. 2003); Sprigman, supra note 78 at 277-78. 
81 Metallgesellschaft AG, 325 F.3d at 842; In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation, 904 F.Supp.2d 
310, 318-320 (E.D.N.Y., 2012). 
82 F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., 542 U.S. at 162. 
83 Id.; Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 796 (citing Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co., 475 U.S. 
at 582; Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d at 444; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW § 415 (1987); Areeda & Turner, supra note 79; cf. Continental Ore Co., 370 U.S. at 704; 
Steele, 344 U.S. at 288; Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. at 275–76; Metallgesellschaft AG, 325 F.3d at 
842; Sprigman, supra note 78. 
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Foreign conduct that results in higher prices in the United States, for 
example, is harm to competition under the effects test. 84  Further, 
eliminating competitors harms competition. 85  Finally, manipulating 
prices through a scheme, such as control and manipulation of a 
benchmark, harms competition under the effects test. 86  The common 
denominator is that “all factors which contribute to determine prices, 
must be kept free to operate unhampered by agreements.” [emphasis 
added].87 
Certainly, a benchmark such as LIBOR contributes to determine 
prices.88 To hold that the manipulation of LIBOR cannot cause harm to 
competition because the setting of the benchmark is not a “competitive 
process” ignores economic reality and the effects test. 89  It further 
instructs domestic and international cartels to undermine competition 
laws. While some may laud the evisceration of private antitrust 
enforcement, the “competitive process” requirement promulgated by In 
re LIBOR opinion, will curtail antitrust enforcement by the DOJ and the 
FTC both domestically and internationally.90 
D. Harm to Competition in In re LIBOR 
LIBOR manipulation harms competition under all recognized 
antitrust theories.  LIBOR manipulation determines price by collusive, 
nonfree market agreements—it is horizontal price fixing. 91  It harms 
consumers, such as the plaintiffs in the In re LIBOR case.92 Finally, it 
harms competition in terms of allocative inefficiency due to the 
inefficiency of fraud. 93  Whether or not manipulating LIBOR is a 
competitive process is irrelevant. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
84 F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., 542 U.S. at 175. 
85 See Continental Ore Co., 370 U.S. at 690 (raising rivals’ costs by eliminating supply source in 
attempt to eliminate competitor); Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d at 434-35; Timberlane 
Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. and S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). 
86 Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 859 (7th Cir. 2012). 
87  U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 445 (1945) (addressing international 
agreement fixing prices indirectly by withdrawing supply from the market through a quota of 
production scheme which, in itself, was not a competitive process). See also Timberlane Lumber 
Co., 549 F.2d 597 (harassment including false arrest of manager and defamatory newspaper articles 
to eliminate competitor). 
88 See Minn-Chem, Inc., 683 F.3d at 859.  
89 15 U.S.C. § 6(a); F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., 542 U.S. at 165; Peter D. St. Phillip, Jr. and 
Raymond P. Girnys, No Antitrust Injury In LIBOR Rate-Setting?—What Happened To Effects?, 
Competition Policy International (May 30, 2013), 
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/no-antitrust-injury-in-libor-rate-setting-what-
happened-to-effects. 
90 See Minn-Chem, Inc., 683 F.3d at 853, 856. 
91 In re LIBOR, 935 F.Supp.2d at 687; U.S. v. Masonite Corporation, 316 U.S. 265, 276 (1942); 
Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 93 (6th Cir. 1944), aff'd, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); U.S. v. 
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 220-22 (1940). See also United States v. Food & Grocery 
Bureau of S. Cal., 43 F. Supp. 974 (S.D. Cal. 1942), aff'd, 139 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1943); Cayman 
Exploration Corp. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 873 F.2d 1357, 1361 (10th Cir. 1989); Foster, supra 
note 18, at 315-16. 
92 In re LIBOR, 935 F.Supp.2d at 666. 
93 Watkins, supra note 76; Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 76. 
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There is a consensus that conduct which effects price in a collusive, 
nonfree market manner is harmful to competition. 94  For antitrust 
purposes, the wealth transfer is created by nonfree market actions is 
unfair to the extent that it exceeds a competitive market value. 95  A 
competitive market is open to access and rivalry and does not permit 
inefficient, collusive conduct. 96  Efficiency, in antitrust law, refers to 
whether the practice is beneficial to society, not to the individual. 97 
Additionally, it is universally held that eliminating competitors harms 
competition unless it results from market efficiencies that are beneficial 
to society such as innovation, quality, or service.98  
Competitor elimination is a wealth transfer issue because it relates to 
price (more competitors—lower prices). Wealth transfers based on non-
competitive markets, fraud, or misinformation, are allocatively 
inefficient and harmful to competition because it causes greater losses 
than gains to society.99 
A critical distinction between the In re LIBOR case and the seminal 
antitrust cases of Brunswick 100  and ARCO 101  is that they are not 
horizontal price fixing cases. 102  Indeed, there are no horizontal price 
fixing cases where a court engaged in a “no harm to competition” 
analysis and found there to be an antitrust injury.103 Horizontal price 
fixing cases lack an antitrust injury due to normal damage considerations 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
94 Lopatka, supra note 51 at 832-33 (“We believe that the most reliable measure of harm to 
competition is the effect of the practice on price and output.”); Blue Shield of Va., 457 U.S. at 482-
84; See, e.g., Xerox Corp., 511 F.Supp.2d at 381; Alternative Electrodes, LLC, 597 F.Supp.2d at 
328-29. Ferrill, Hyman & Valenciano, supra note 60; Guidelines at p.15; Rebel Oil Co., Inc., 51 
F.3d at 1433. Cudahy & Devlin, Anticompetitive Effect, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 59 (2010). Aluminum Co. 
of America, 148 F.2d at 445; F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., 542 U.S. at 175. 
95  Robert Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The 
Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 Hastings L.J. 65 (1982); See Robert H. Lande, A 
Traditional And Textualist Analysis Of The Goals Of Antitrust: Efficiency, Preventing Theft From 
Consumers, And Consumer Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2349, 2373 (2013) (wealth transfer 
concerns of antitrust law and efficiency concerns for antitrust laws are not mutually exclusive). 
96 Thomas W. Snyder and William Fitzsimmons, Putting A Price On Dirt: The Need For Better-
Defined Limits On Government Fees For Use Of The Public Right-Of-Way Under Section 253 Of 
The Telecommunications Act Of 1996, 64 FED. COMM. L.J. 137, 167 (2011)(A competitive market is 
a market in which no single entity or combination of entities can exert undue market power to 
control prices or the values of assets). 
97 For antitrust purposes, efficiency is conduct that increases output or consumer welfare. Frank 
X. Taney, Rewriting The Law Of Resale Price Maintenance: The Kodak Decision And Transaction 
Cost Economics, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 321, 339 (1994). 
98  Blue Shield of Va., 457 U.S. at 482-84; See, e.g., Xerox Corp., 511 F.Supp.2d at 381; 
Alternative Electrodes, LLC, 597 F.Supp.2d at 328-29. Ferrill, Hyman & Valenciano, supra note 60; 
Continental Ore Co., 370 U.S. at 690 (raising rivals’ costs by eliminating supply source in attempt to 
eliminate competitor); Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d at 434-35; Timberlane Lumber Co., 549 
F.2d at 597. 
99 Watkins, supra note 76, at n.94; Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 76, at 403. 
100 Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 477. 
101 Atl. Richfield Co., 495 U.S. at 328. 
102 In re LIBOR, 935 F. Supp.2d at 687, is a horizontal price fixing case; Foster, supra note 3, at 
316-18. 
103 Ariel Katz, Making Sense of Nonsense: Intellectual Property, Antitrust, and Market Power, 
49 Ariz. L. Rev. 837, 892 (2007); Carole A. Casey, The Rule of Reason Analysis of Dual 
Distribution Systems: Does it Further the Purposes of the Sherman Act? 29 B.C. L. Rev. 431, 435 
(1988). 
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such as lack of causation, lack of foreseeability, speculation, or 
remoteness (efficient enforcer rule). But the In re LIBOR court’s decision 
is not based on these factors. It finds no harm to competition because the 
LIBOR process is not a “competitive process.” This suggests, for the first 
time, a court may base its “no antitrust injury” decision in a horizontal 
price fixing case on a “no harm to competition” analysis. 
In re LIBOR does not involve competitive conduct harmful to 
competitors but beneficial to consumers.104 The In re LIBOR plaintiffs 
were consumers of the defendants’ financial products. Accordingly, the 
In re LIBOR case does not involve a competitor’s suit as in the seminal 
antitrust injury cases of Brunswick and ARCO. Furthermore, in 
Brunswick and ARCO, the nonparty consumers were benefitted by the 
defendants’ conduct. 
Whether manipulating LIBOR harms competition depends on 
whether the conduct caused an improper wealth transfer. For example, 
there may be harm if plaintiffs paid a higher price, or received reduced 
profits, or if competitors were eliminated. The allegations in In re LIBOR 
suggest that the answers to these questions are affirmative.105 Also, if 
defendants’ conduct resulted in allocative inefficiencies then the 
allegations in In re LIBOR would also suggest that the answer is 
affirmative.106 The plaintiffs lost profits or paid higher prices because the 
defendants manipulated LIBOR. Defendants’ conduct was not 
allocatively efficient because advancing misinformation or fraud is 
allocatively inefficient.107 Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ allegations should 
be sufficient to establish harm to competition. 
IV. WHAT IS THE “COMPETITIVE PROCESS”? 
Whether the LIBOR process is a “competitive process” is irrelevant 
in determining if competition was harmed.108 There is neither binding nor 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
104 To posit that suppressing the LIBOR interest rate benchmark benefits consumers of some 
financial products, such as mortgages with adjustable interest rates tied to LIBOR is in error. LIBOR 
rates relevant to mortgages may have been adjusted up for the readjustment date and back down the 
next day. Adams v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 12-cv-07461 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2012); Foster, supra 
note 3, at 319. 
105 In re LIBOR, 935 F.Supp.2d at 697. 
106 Id. 
107 Watkins, supra note 76, at n.94; Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 76 at 403. 
108 Evidently, the parties stipulated that the LIBOR process was not a competitive process. In re 
LIBOR, 935 F. Supp. 2d at 687. While parties’ stipulations may streamline litigation, they do not 
change facts. Is the LIBOR data provided by panel members a competitive process? Is being a panel 
member so you can provide the data and, hence control interest rates, a competitive process? That 
depends on how one defines a competitive process. It has been defined in many ways: a process 
market organization is open, small competitors have a right to compete on the merits and their ability 
to compete not impaired by dominant entrepreneurs. Protecting the competitive process requires 
restraint of dominant entrepreneurs conduct not related to competition on the merits and that 
prevents other entrepreneurs from competing. See Luca Rubini, MICROSOFT ON TRIAL: ECONOMIC 
AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF A TRANSATLANTIC ANTITRUST CASES 470 (2010); Cris M. Currie, 
Opinion Wanted: A Theoretical Construct for Mediation Practice, 53 DISP. RESOL. J. 70, 72 (1998) 
(citing to M. Deutsch, THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT (1973) (“Competitive processes are those 
which seek to satisfy personal interests at the expense of joint interests, inhibit the expression of 
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persuasive authority in In re LIBOR to suggest that if the practice in 
question is not a competitive process there can be no harm to 
competition. Indeed, the authority suggests that if the practice is a 
facilitating practice, then the opposite is true.109 At least one lower court 
has held that antitrust laws were meant to protect the “competitive 
process.” 110 In this context, “competitive process” is synonymous with 
“harm to competition.” 111  If harm to the “competitive process” is 
synonymous with “harm to competition,” then, according to the LIBOR 
court, one must suffer harm to competition in order to have harm to 
competition. 
To support the assertion that harm to competition leads to harm to the 
competitive process,112 the proper question is whether agreeing to submit 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
disagreement, lean toward overconformity and rigidity rather than flexibility and creativity, and 
overemphasize differences while ignoring commonalities. They typically lead to poor 
communication, misperception, misjudgment, and an over valuing of self-consistency.”). See also 
M. Deutsch, “A Framework for Teaching Conflict Resolution in the Schools,” in 2 B.H. Sheppard, 
M.H. Bazerman, and R. Lewicki, (Ed.), RESEARCH ON NEGOTIATION IN ORGANIZATIONS 189-203 
(1990); Harry S. Gerla, Federal Antitrust Law and Trade and Professional Association Standards 
and Certification, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 471, 474 (1994) (citing to Indian Head, Inc. v. Allied Tube 
& Conduit Corp., 486 U.S. 492, 501 (1988)) (“the rivalrous process through which competitors seek 
to divert business from rivals by offering superior products and services to consumers; [or the] 
aggregate net output of goods and services. Thus, if a restraint does not negatively impact net output, 
it does not adversely affect competition. Conversely, if a restraint enhances output, it is pro-
competitive.”). One could argue that the LIBOR setting process was a competitive process 
particularly when one considers the qualifiers as articulated by the BBA in selecting panel members, 
such as reputation, credit quality, and activity in London as London is a major international financial 
market. Jacob Gyntelberg & Philip Wooldridge, Interbank Rate Fixings During Recent Turmoil, 
(March 2008), http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt0803g.pdf. For an interesting treatment of the 
definitional problems in antitrust law see Cudahy & Devlin, Anticompetitive Effect, 95 MINN. L. 
REV. 59 (2010). 
109 Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 445 (addressing international agreement fixing prices 
indirectly by withdrawing supply from the market through a quota of production scheme which, in 
itself, was not a competitive process); see Timberlane Lumber Co., 549 F.2d at 597 (harassment, 
including false arrest of manager and defamatory newspaper articles to eliminate competitor, 
arguably not a competitive process); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. People’s Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 
U.S. 659, 360 (1961); MCI Commc’n Corp. v. AT&T, 740 F.2d 980 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Gerla, supra 
note 108, at 471-72. 
110 Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 902 (9th Cir. 2008). 
111 Id. at 902-03 (citing to Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489; Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder–
Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164 (2006) (“Interbrand competition, our opinions affirm, is the primary 
concern of antitrust law.” (internal quotation omitted)); Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 
U.S. 447, 458 (1993) (“The purpose of the [Sherman] Act is not to protect businesses from the 
working of the market; it is to protect the public from the failure of the market. The law directs itself 
not against conduct which is competitive, even severely so, but against conduct which unfairly tends 
to destroy competition itself.”); Atl. Richfield Co., 495 U.S. at 331 (holding that a firm does not incur 
an antitrust injury when it loses sales to a competitor charging nonpredatory prices pursuant to a 
vertical, maximum-price-fixing scheme); Cargill, Inc., 479 U.S. at 113 (extending antitrust injury 
requirement to suits for injunctive relief under § 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26); J. Truett 
Payne Co., 451 U.S. at 562 (extending antitrust injury requirement to price discrimination suits 
arising under § 2 of the Clayton Act). The Court's reasoning and conclusions in Brooke Group, as 
reaffirmed recently in Weyerhaeuser, accordingly show a measured concern to leave unhampered 
pricing practices that might benefit consumers, absent the clearest showing that an injury to the 
competitive process will result. United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001); 
Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1060–61 (8th Cir. 2000); see Cudahy & 
Devlin, Anticompetitive Effect, 95 MINN. L. REV. 59 (2010). 
112 See Peter J. Prommer, The Pioneer and Generic Drug Manufacturer Agreements: Is the 
Sherman Act Big Enough to Swallow These Pills? 2002 U. ILL.  J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 215, 222 (2002); 
Lopatka, supra note 51 at 834-36. 
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fraudulent LIBOR data harms the competitive process. The question is 
not whether the LIBOR process is competitive. Therefore, the court’s 
holding that there can be no harm to competition because the LIBOR 
process is not itself a competitive process departs from precedent.113  
V. STANDARD SETTING ANALOGY 
Because LIBOR is a benchmark set by market participants with 
market power, it is analogous to market participants setting industry 
standards. The standard setters may harm competition if they are driven 
by anticompetitive reasons, such as their own personal interests, rather 
than for the welfare of the consumer.114 A standard for pricing goods or 
services in a particular industry would certainly be the type of conduct 
that harms competition regardless of whether standard settings is a 
competitive process.115 
While setting standards and benchmarks certainly have 
procompetitive aspects, courts have never held these activities to be 
immune from antitrust laws because the process of setting standards is 
not a competitive process. Indeed, courts have recognized that the 
process of standard setting and information sharing between competitors 
is highly suspect under antitrust law, particularly where the standards are 
set by competitors 116  with significant market power 117  and no 
safeguards.118 
The In re LIBOR court did address the standard setting law, however, 
the court concluded that there can be no harm to competition if the 
LIBOR setting process is not competitive. Instead the court concluded 
that in each of the plaintiffs’ standard setting cases, there was a 
distinction because there was harm to competition in the cited cases but 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
113 Peter D. St. Phillip, Jr. & Raymond P. Girnys, No Antitrust Injury In Libor Rate-Setting?—
What Happened To Effects?, COMPETITION POLICY INTERNATIONAL (May 30, 2013), 
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/no-antitrust-injury-in-libor-rate-setting-what-
happened-to-effects. 
114 Elbert L. Robertson, A Corrective Justice Theory of Antitrust Regulation, 49 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 741, 7761-62 (2000); Radiant Burners, 364 U.S. at 360; S. Pac. Commc’ns Co. v. Am. Tel. and 
Tel. Co., 740 F.2d 980 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Gerla, supra note 108, at 481; citing David Hemenway, 
Industrywide Voluntary Product Standards 8 (1975). Cf. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of 
Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
115 Gerla, supra note 108, at 494 (citing  FTC v. Superior Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 
432-36 (1990); Am. Column & Lumber Co, 257 U.S. at 377; Nat’l Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Nat’l 
Contractors Ass'n, 689 F.2d 1196 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1234 (1983)). 
116  Gerla, supra note 108; 2 JULIAN O. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE 
REGULATION 6I-26-7 (1993); Consol. Metal Prods. v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 846 F.2d 284, 295 (5th 
Cir. 1988) (emphasizing lack of competitor representation on decision making body); Eliason Corp. 
v. Nat’l Sanitation Found., 614 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1981) 
(standards by independent nonprofit organization upheld in spite of claim that they allegedly favored 
larger manufacturers over smaller manufacturers and impeded innovative designs). 
117 Market power is another definitional nightmare. Generally, it is the power to raise prices or 
eliminate competitors, reduce output, dominate customers or suppliers without suffering significant 
negative consequences. Gerla, supra note 108. See also Hovenkamp, supra note 39, at 272-73; 
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 563; U.S. v. E. I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956); 
Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 307 (3d Cir. 2007). 
118 Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., 486 U.S. at 500-01. 
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none in the LIBOR case.119 The court ignored the fact that each of the 
standard setting cases involved conduct similar to the LIBOR process of 
sharing information to set a standard or benchmark and that such conduct 
harmed competition. 120  The only relevant distinction between the 
standard setting cases distinguished by the court and the LIBOR setting 
conduct is that past courts did not require that the standard setting 
conduct be a “competitive process” to find harm to competition. Indeed, 
quite the opposite is true: courts have held it sufficient that standard 
setting conduct harmed competition. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
119 In re LIBOR, 935 F.Supp.2d at 691-92. 
120 Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., 486 U.S. at 500-01 (In this case there was an attempt to 
exclude respondent’s product from the market. However, the Court noted: “[t]here is no doubt that 
the members of such associations often have economic incentives to restrain competition and that the 
product standards set by such associations have a serious potential for anticompetitive harm.”). Id. at 
n.5 (“Product standardization might impair competition in several ways.... [It] might deprive some 
consumers of a desired product, eliminate quality competition, exclude rival producers, or facilitate 
oligopolistic pricing by easing rivals' ability to monitor each other's prices.”). Areeda, supra note 58, 
at 373. When, however, private associations promulgate safety standards based on the merits of 
objective expert judgments and through procedures that prevent the standard-setting process from 
being biased by members with economic interests in stifling product competition, cf. Hydrolevel, 
456 U.S., at 570–73 (noting absence of “meaningful safeguards”), those private standards can have 
significant procompetitive advantages.   
The Court does not require the standard setting process be a “competitive process” to be 
anticompetitive or harmful to competition. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 456 (specifically 
rejecting 7th Cir. position, similar to In re LIBOR court’s, that defendant association’s members did 
not compete regarding the agreement to suppress information).  In Allied Tube the Court held: 
“[T]hese criticisms of the Commission's findings [are not] well founded. The Commission's finding 
that ‘[i]n the absence of . . . concerted behavior, individual dentists would have been subject to 
market forces of competition, creating incentives for them to . . . [provide information to insurance 
companies]… finds support not only in common sense and economic theory, upon both of which the 
FTC may reasonably rely, but also in record documents.’” The Court rejects the competitive process 
requirement for the sharing of information. 
Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. U.S., 435 U.S. 679, 692, 98 (1978) (where a trade association 
agreed to standardize a process of no competitive bidding, the Court held: “an agreement that 
‘interfere[s] with the setting of price by free market forces’ is illegal on its face.”); Woods 
Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 438 F.2d 1286, 1303 (5th Cir. 1971) 
(actions taken . . . for anticompetitive purposes are subject to antitrust strictures where the actions 
interfere with price, no requirement that the “actions” be a “competitive process”); Plymouth 
Dealers' Ass'n of N. Cal. v. U.S., 279 F.2d 128, 132 (9th Cir.1960) (competitors provide information 
for list prices; the competition between the Plymouth dealers and the fact that the dealers used the 
fixed uniform list price in most instances only as a starting point, is of no consequence. It was an 
agreed starting point; it had been agreed upon between competitors; it was in some instances in the 
record respected and followed; it had to do with, and had its effect upon, price); In re Rail Freight 
Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 587 F. Supp. 2d 27, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (alleging an injury to 
competition by allegation paid supracompetitive prices due to defendants price fix through their use 
of fuel surcharges; no requirement that the fuel surcharge process be a competitive process); 
Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 232 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding harm to 
competition by collusive price manipulation where defendants conspired to reduce milk prices); Ice 
Cream Liquidation, Inc. v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 262, 272 (D. Conn. 2003) (alleging 
that cooperatives of dairy farmers conspired to fix the prices of dairy products – “plaintiff claims to 
have been forced to pay prices not set by free market competition, but rather by defendants' price-
fixing scheme; the injury alleged by plaintiff is the type of injury the Sherman Act, which seeks to 
preserve free and unfettered competition, was designed to prevent.”). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
“If you’re not confused, then you don’t understand.” 121  In In re 
LIBOR the court did not answer whether LIBOR manipulation, primarily 
anticompetitive wealth transfers in the form of price fixing or elimination 
of competitors and allocative inefficiencies, directly harmed plaintiffs. 
Rather, the court created a new requirement that only those activities that 
are a product of a competitive process can harm competition. There is no 
statute, case law, nor scholarly authority for this new requirement—but it 
effectively eviscerates disfavored private civil antitrust law. If this 
holding stands, it may lead to negative unintended consequences in 
international antitrust enforcement. 
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121 Grey Owl Capital Management, Market Outlook: If You’re Not Confused, Then You Don’t 
Understand, SEEKING ALPHA (Jan. 28, 2010, 8:20 A.M.) http://seekingalpha.com/article/185054-
market-outlook-if-youre-not-confused-then-you-dont-understand (quoting Edward R. Murrow). 
